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MARITAL STRESS OR GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE?
RE-THINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN R2P
AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ABSTRACT. This article analyzes the relationship between R2P and international
criminal justice. Both projects draw on similar foundations, such as sovereignty as
responsibility’, a humanity-based defence of international authority and complemen-
tarity-oriented response schemes to atrocity crimes. In past years, they have become
subject to a number of common criticisms that are typical of other forms of interna-
tional humanitarianism: application of double standards, assertion of power under the
label of human rights and communitarian conceptions of international society or
mediation of victims without agency. This contribution draws on an analogy to family
law, namely idea of partnership and marriage, to analyze the status quo of the rela-
tionship. It argues that the coupling of these two traditions has not received enough
attention in the emergence and treatment of R2P. It shows that it is a marriage’ based
on pragmatism and without contract. It investigates existing discourse and interaction
problems. It claims that there is a need for greater distinction between R2P and in-
ternational criminal justice, in order to respect their autonomy and mutual virtues.
Integration and mainstreaming carries risks. Both strands of action share partly dif-
ferent goals and methodologies. None of the two should be viewed as a tool at the
service of the other. Instead, it is more helpful to develop interaction in speciﬁc areas.
Synergies exist in relation to speciﬁc functions, such as atrocity alert, norm expres-
sivism and compliance. These communalities should be reinforced.
I INTRODUCTION
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)1 exists for more than a decade.
Since 2005 it is an oﬃcial concept in United Nations doctrine.
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Opinions on the concept diﬀer fundamentally. Some regard R2P as
‘‘the most dramatic normative development of our time’’2 or a new
grundnorm of the international legal order (e.g., Dworkin,3 Peters4).
Others caution against its ambivalence, problems and risks. The
importance of R2P can be assessed by the number of critiques that it
has been exposed, which range from normative, conceptual and in-
stitutional criticisms to Third World and gender based-strands of
Footnote 1 continued
Brookings Institution Press, 2008); A. J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: The
Global Eﬀort to End Mass Atrocities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); J. Pattison,
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); A. Orford, International Authority and the
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); W. Andy
Knight and Frazer Egerton (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to
Protect (New York: Routledge, 2012); P. Cunliﬀe (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the
Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge,
2011); Z. Genteri (ed.), An Institutional Approach to the Responsibility to Protect
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). See also C. Stahn, Responsibility
to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (2007) 101 American
Journal of International Law 99; A. J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect—Five
Years On’ (2010) 24 Ethics & International Aﬀairs 143–169; G. Evans, The Re-
sponsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come . . . and Gone?’ (2008) 22
International Relations 283–298; E. Strauss, Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the
Bush—On the Assumed Legal Nature of the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1
Global Responsibility to Protect 291; L. Glanville, The Antecedents of ‘‘Sovereignty
as Responsibility’’’ (2011) 17 European Journal of International Relations 233; D.
Chandler, Unravelling the Paradox of the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 20 Irish
Studies in International Aﬀairs 27–39; F. Me´gret, Beyond the Salvation’ Paradigm:
Responsibility To Protect (Others) vs the Power of Protecting Oneself’ (2009) 40
Security Dialogue 575–585; E. C. Luck, Building a Norm: The Responsibility to
Protect Experience’ in R. I. Rotberg (ed.), Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future
Outrages (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 108–127; E. C. Luck,
Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 Global Responsi-
bility to Protect 10–21.
2 R. Thakur and T. G. Weiss, R2P: From Idea to Norm – and Action?’ (2009) 1
Global Responsibility to Protect 22.
3 See R. Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law’ (2013) 41 Philosophy
& Public Aﬀairs 2–30.
4 A. Peters, Humanity as the A˚ and ¢X of Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 European Journal
of International Law 513–544.
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critique.5 Some have even proclaimed its alleged death as a functional
concept, after Libya6 or in the face of inaction relating to Syria.7 The
sheer amount of discussion of the concept, its incremental application
in UN practices (e.g., fact-ﬁnding, human rights) and policy, and
attempts to improve its functioning (e.g., Responsibility While Pro-
tecting), suggest that reports about the ‘‘death of R2P’’ are greatly
exaggerated.8 The discussion on R2P is sometimes reminiscent of the
Tower of Babel. Much of the controversy is rooted in diﬀerent un-
derstandings of the concept or focus on speciﬁc sites of debate.
In existing discourse, little attention has been devoted to some of
the founding premises of the concept, namely the link between re-
sponsibility under R2P and international criminal justice.9 R2P
5 For critiques of diﬀerent aspects of R2P, see D. Chandler, The Responsibility to
Protect: Imposing the Liberal Peace’ (2004) 11 International Peacekeeping 59–81; id.,
R2P or Not R2P? More Statebuilding, Less Responsibility’ (2010) 2 Global Re-
sponsibility to Protect 161; A. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?
The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq’ (2005) Ethics and
International Aﬀairs 31–53; C. Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and
Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine’ (2008)
13 Journal of Conﬂict and Security Law 191; M. Mamdani Responsibility to Protect
or Right to Punish?’ (2010) 4 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 53–67; L. Hall
and L. J. Shepherd, WPS and R2P: Theorising Responsibility and Protection’, in S.
E. Davies, Z. Nwokora, E. Stamnes and S. Teitt (eds.), The Responsibility to Protect
and Women, Peace and Security (Leiden: Brill, 2013) 53–80; R. Paris, The ‘‘Re-
sponsibility to Protect’’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian
Intervention’ (2014) 21 International Peacekeeping 569–603.
6 See D. Rieﬀ, R2P, R.I.P.’, New York Times, 7 November 2911, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
7 M. Newton, R2P is dead and done’ due to response to Syria’, 16 September
2013, at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/2013/09/newton-%E2%80%9Cr2p-is-dead-
and-done%E2%80%9D-because-of-response-to-syria/.
8 For a discussion, see C. Stahn and C. Harwood, Why Reports about the ’Death
of R2P’ May be Premature: Links between the Responsibility to Protect and Human
Rights Fact-Finding’ (2014) 3 ESIL Reﬂection, at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/fr/
node/608.
9 For an exception, see F. Me´gret, ICC, R2P, and the International Community’s
Evolving Interventionist Toolkit’ (2010) 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law
21–51; S. Nouwen, Complementarity in Practice: Critical Lessons from the ICC for
R2P’ (2010) 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 53–64; M. Kersten, A Fatal
Attraction? The UN Security Council and the Relationship between R2P and the
International Criminal Court’, in J. Handmaker and K. Arts (eds.), International
Law and the Politics of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forth-
coming); E. F. Defeis, The Responsibility to Protect and International Justice’
(2011) 10 Hofstra Journal of International Business and Law 91.
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emerged in the tradition of just war theory and intervention.10 One of
its trademarks is its mix of moral duties and interventionist response
schemes with notions of international criminal justice.11 R2P has
synergies with principles of protection and humanitarian action12. It
is built on ideas of prevention, protection and remedial response that
are typical of humanitarian action.13 The underlying principles do
not necessarily coincide with goals of international justice. Interna-
tional criminal justice is sometimes associated with a claim to rep-
resent humanity.14 But imperatives of neutrality and purposes of
protection of victims are at best secondary considerations. Justice
intervention is guided by particular objectives, such as the determi-
nation of accountability and the independence of justice (e.g.,
prosecutorial and judicial independence). It involves diﬀerent goals
and prioritizations than human rights advocacy or humanitarian
relief (e.g., allocation of individual criminal responsibility, due pro-
cess protection etc.). It is typically perpetrator-centred, rather than
victim-focused, and targeted in focus. In the World Summit Outcome
Document, the two projects have been paired with each other
through the focus on atrocity crimes, without deeper reﬂection on the
merger of these distinct traditions.15
10 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The
Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre,
2001), at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (hereinafter ICISS
Report).
11 See ICISS Report, paras. 4.18–4.43 (relying on just war theory criteria, such as
‘‘just cause’’ and ‘‘right intent’’).
12 Humanitarian action is generally associated with the principles of humanity,
impartiality and neutrality. See H. Haider, International Legal Frameworks for Hu-
manitarian Action: Topic Guide (Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birm-
ingham, 2013), at 6.
13 See e.g., ICRC Protection Policy: Institutional Policy’ (2008) 90 IRRC 751, 759.
14 See the preamble of the ICC Statute, which speaks of crime that that shock
conscience of mankind’. See also generally J. Hoover, Moral Practices: Assigning
Responsibility in the International Criminal Court’ (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary
Problems 263, 285; R. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011).
15 See UNGA, World Summit Outcome Document’ (2005) UN Doc. A/RES/60/
1, para. 138. See also J. E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P’ in P. Alston and
E. Macdonald (eds.), Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008) 276.
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The reasons for this merger are both, functional and emotive.
They go beyond rational choice or realpolitics. International criminal
justice provides a strategy and language that is appealing to the en-
forcement of R2P. It oﬀers the doctrine a normative grounding in law
that mitigates biases against R2P. The use of criminal law semantics
shifts the focus from subjective moral and political choices to uni-
versally defensible interests. Moreover, it strengthens the very as-
sumption that R2P entails a legal nucleus. But a too close alignment
may actually compromise the cause and perception of justice. This
has become evident over past years. In the eyes of those aﬀected by
intervention, R2P and international criminal justice have become
vulnerable to some of the same types of criticism that have voiced
against coercive forms of transformative humanitarianism over dec-
ades: selectivity and application of double standards’, creation of
new types of victimhood’ without agency, and empowerment of in-
ternational authority under the guise of human rights.16
This contribution draws on a family law analogy, namely the idea
of partnership and marriage, to analyze the status quo of the rela-
tionship.17 It argues that the coupling of these two traditions has not
received enough attention in the emergence and treatment of R2P. It
ﬁrst examines the emergence of the relationship. It argues that it was
a marriage out of pragmatism and moral appeal. It then analyzes the
premises of the relationship, i.e. assumptions regarding the roles of
the partners. It investigate existing discourse and interaction. Based
on this, it inquires to what extent these relational problems provide a
ground for divorce, as argued by some (e.g., Chandler18) or a cause
for mutual duties of care’.
16 For a powerful R2P critique, see A. Branch, The Irresponsibility of the Re-
sponsibility to Protect in Africa’, in Cunliﬀe (n 1 above), 103, 115. See also P.
Cunliﬀe, Dangerous Duties: Power, Paternalism and the Responsibility to Protect’’
(2010) 36 Review of International Studies 79. For an ICC critique, see P. McAuliﬀe,
From Watchdog to Workhorse: Explaining the Emergence of the ICC’s Burden-
sharing Policy as an Example of Creeping Cosmopolitanism’ (2014) 13 Chinese
Journal of International Law 259.
17 Me´gret speaks of international criminal justice as a responsible partner’ of R2P.
Me´gret (n 9 above) at 29.
18 See D. Chandler, Born Posthumously: Re-Thinking the Shared Characteristics
of the ICC and R2P’ (2010) 21 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 1–9.
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II A MARRIAGE OUT OF PRAGMATISM AND MORAL
APPEAL
At the outset, it is useful to look back at the mating phase, i.e. the
beginning of the aﬀair. Both international criminal justice and R2P
are modern articulations of ideas that have been inherent in inter-
national law for centuries. Both of them gained acceptance because
they combined claims for a relative’ understanding of state
sovereignty with re-aﬃrmations of state power, or even deference to
sovereignty’.19 The formation of R2P was visibly driven by gradual
shifts away from rights-based’ approaches towards intervention20
and growing enthusiasm over the nexus between peace, justice and
human rights at the end of the 1990s.21 Originally, there were dif-
ferent conceptions of R2P. The atrocity-crime based vision gained
acceptance in UN negotiations in 2005. It was assumed that R2P and
international criminal justice share suﬃcient identity features to be
connected. The contours, limits and risks of that relationship received
limited attention.
2.1 Diverse Identities
R2P and international criminal justice share synergies. They are
normative projects with certain protective and behavioral purposes.
They ﬁt partly within a strand of transformative humanitarianism
that has gained ground over the past century.22 They both set out to
19 Me´gret (n 9 above), at 36. This is reﬂected in the primary responsibility of States
under para. 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document and the complementarity
regime of the ICC. For an understanding of complementarity as responsibility, see C.
Stahn, Taking Complementarity Seriously: On the Sense and Sensibility of ‘‘Clas-
sical’’, ‘‘Positive’’ and ‘‘Negative’’ Complementarity’, in C. Stahn and M. El Zeidy
(eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to
Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 233–281.
20 Rights-based approaches towards humanitarian action became a prominent
feature in the 1980’s with the invocation of the ‘‘droit d’ingerence’’ by NGOs in the
Biafra crisis. See D. Chandler, The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the
Human Rights NGOs Shaped A New Humanitarian Agenda’ (2001) 23 Human
Rights Quarterly 678–700.
21 See also Chandler (n 18 above), at 6 (‘‘they were seen to be symbols of the global
cosmopolitan order of liberal rights and justice, which the 1990s appeared to pro-
mise’’). For a critique, see also M Koskenniemi, Human Rights Mainstreaming as a
Strategy for Institutional Power’ (2010) 1 Humanity 47–58.
22 There are diﬀerent strands of humanitarianism, the classical samaritan’ model
associated with the humanitarian movement (based on humanity, neutrality, im-
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protect victims from harm. They ultimately seek to promote re-
sponsible use of sovereign power by governments.23 Moreover, they
coincide in their ambition to outlaw and ban intolerable human
conduct, through prevention and attribution of responsibility for
action or inaction.
The rapid growth and practice of international criminal justice
over the past decades has provided a normative impetus for the de-
velopment of R2P.24 But the deeper question to what extent inter-
national criminal justice and R2P actually share common
characteristics has not been explored in any great depth. The two
projects enjoy separate identities.
R2P is an umbrella concept. It draws on ideas and inﬂuences from
diﬀerent areas. The main idea of sovereignty as responsibility’ is
grounded in human rights and duty-based conceptions of State au-
thority. The response scheme (i.e. remedying suﬀering of others) is
inﬂuenced by just war theory and the humanitarian tradition. The
remedial component (e.g., prevention and reaction, with an aversion
towards unilateralism) is strongly rooted in international institu-
tionalism and the cosmopolitan tradition.25 Each of these dimensions
has a certain grounding in international law. The claim that sovereign
authority is answerable internally is rooted in human rights law and
standards of democratic governance. The idea that violations of
duties entail external responsibility is grounded in the law of State
Footnote 22 continued
partiality), and a more (human rights) driven form which is in essence transfor-
mative’ in nature. The dilemma of the latter is that it requires a fundamental re-
deﬁnition of humanitarian principles. See generally M. Barnett, Empire of Humanity:
a History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011).
The ICC bears traces of this. The samaritan’ analogy does not work fully since ICC
engagement is party- and interest driven. Victim protection and participation is tied
to the case/situation shaped by the OTP. ICC action ﬁts partly within the tradition of
transformative humanitarianism and its dilemmas which require justiﬁcation (e.g.,
based on acceptance of authority, expert knowledge, accountability etc.).
23 See also Me´gret, who qualiﬁes R2P and the ICC as ‘‘projects of making good
sovereigns’’. Me´gret (n 9 above), at 38.
24 D. Scheﬀer, Atrocity Crimes: Framing the Responsibility to Protect’, in R.
H. Cooper and J. V. Kohler (eds.), Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral
Compact for the 21st Century (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009) 77–98, 80–81.
25 On the diverse nature of R2P, see Alvarez (n 15 above).
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responsibility, humanitarian duties26 and concepts of solidarity and
care.27 Speciﬁc response schemes, such as prevention and reaction,
can be traced back to speciﬁc treaty regimes (e.g., Genocide Con-
vention28), Charter mechanisms and limits to non-intervention (e.g.,
peace and security under the UN Charter, African Union). Con-
straints may be derived from jus ad bellum and jus in bello (e.g.,
proportionality, principle of distinction).
Modern international criminal justice emerged in the tradition of
peace-maintenance. But it shares distinct normative premises. It
protects speciﬁc human rights (e.g., defendants’ rights) and pays in-
creasingly tribute to victims. It is less concerned with the idea of State
responsibility for violations or State failure’. It has typically fought
for the emancipation of individual criminal responsibility from the
responsibility of the State, as reﬂected in the (too often repeated, yet
continuously valid) Nuremberg dictum that ‘‘crimes are committed by
men, not by abstract entities’’).29 It captures only a fraction of human
rights and humanitarian violations. It has become increasingly hostile
to the idea of enforcing accountability through coercive action. It
serves as a disincentive to intervention through growing criminal-
ization of unlawful uses of force (e.g., the crime of aggression).30
26 For instance, the Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols establish obligations, responsibility and legal accountability for actions
and omissions, and non-interventionist aspects of prevention.
27 On the duty of care, see e.g., L. Arbour, The Responsibility to Protect as a
Duty of Care in International Law and Practice’ (2008) 34 Review of International
Studies 445–458, 445. On solidarity, see ILC, Second report on the protection of
persons in the event of disasters, A/CN.4/615, 7 May 2009, para. 54, (‘‘Solidarity as
an international legal principle, and distinct from charity, gives rise to a system of
cooperation in furtherance of the notion that justice and the common good are best
served by policies that beneﬁt all nations’’).
28 See ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia) (Merits), 26 February 2007,
para. 430.
29 International Military Tribunal, France et al. v. Goering t al., (1946) 22 IMT
411, 466.
30 On aggression, see L. May, Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008); K. Sellars, Crimes against Peace’ and Interna-
tional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); C. McDougall, The
Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); K. Ambos, The Crime of Ag-
gression after Kampala’ (2010) 53 German Yearbook of International Law 463–509;
C. Kreß and L. von Holtzendorﬀ, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of
Aggression’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1179.
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Moreover, it tends to stress the autonomy of justice responses from
other response schemes, i.e. through its emphasis on judicial and
prosecutorial independence. These diﬀerences become ever more
aware, as R2P and international criminal justice are coming of age.
2.2 An Arranged Marriage
The idea to merge international criminal justice and R2P was not
inherent in the concept. It was arranged. It emerged in the context of
the negotiating history of the concept.
The ﬁrst instrument, i.e. the Report of the Commission on State
Sovereignty and Intervention (ICISS Report) sought to identify
guidelines for intervention. It contained only marginal references to
international criminal justice. It defended a broad conception of R2P.
It contained a broad understanding of ‘‘just causes’’ for intervention,
focused on ‘‘conscience-shocking situation[s]’’.31 The Commission
placed the emphasis on ‘‘protection needs’’. It linked human pro-
tection in situations of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression and
state collapse. It identiﬁed ‘‘two broad sets of circumstances’’, where
R2P comes into play, namely:
large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is
the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a
failed state situation; or
large scale ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing,
forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.32
The Commission drew no distinction between circumstances caused
by State action or action by non-state actors.33 It speciﬁed that R2P
could be triggered by natural disasters and non-man made causes,
such as
overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is
either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and signiﬁcant loss of life is
occurring or threatened.34
31 ICISS Report, para. 4.20.
32 ICISS Report, para. 419.
33 It argued that ‘‘when it comes to the threshold ‘‘just cause’’ issue of determining
whether the circumstances are grave enough to justify intervention, it makes no basic
moral diﬀerence whether it is state or non-state actors who are putting people at
risk’’. ICISS Report, para. 4.22.
34 ICISS Report, para. 4.20.
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It took into account the nexus of protection to socio-economic rights,
such as access to food, employment and environmental security.35
The Commission grounded this understanding in three diﬀerent
considerations:
(i) The limits to the principle of non-intervention’ under the UN
Charter36;
(ii) ‘‘standards of conduct for states in the protection and ad-
vancement of international human rights’’37; and
(iii) the idea of ‘‘universal justice’’ (or ‘‘justice without borders’’),
i.e. the ‘‘transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a
culture of national and international accountability’’.38
The scope of application of R2P was limited in the process of UN
negotiations. The Report of the High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change connected the concept to UN response
schemes and existing practice. It excluded natural disasters focused
on ‘‘man –made catastrophes’’,39 in line with the ‘‘human security’’
focus of the Security Council in situations, such as ‘‘Somalia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and … Darfur, Sudan’’.40 It
placed the emphasis on ‘‘deliberate action’’ and what it termed
‘‘avoidable catastrophe’’. It recognized the
responsibility to protect’’ of every State when it comes to people suﬀering from
avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion
and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease.41
It focused the trigger of R2P on human atrocities, namely:
35 Ibid., para. 2.22 (‘‘One of the virtues of expressing the key issue … as ‘‘the
responsibility to protect’’ is that it focuses attention where it should be most con-
centrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance. The em-
phasis in the security debate shifts, with this focus, from territorial security, and
security through armaments, to security through human development with access to
food and employment, and to environmental security.’’)
36 Ibid., paras. 2.7–2.10.
37 Ibid., paras. 2.16 and 2.17.
38 Ibid., paras. 2.18–2.20.
39 UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A more Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility’, Un. Doc. A/59/565 (2004), para. 199.
40 Ibid., para. 201.
41 Ibid.
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genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless
or unwilling to prevent.42
The move towards identiﬁable violations was tied to exceptions to the
principle of non-intervention in UN practice. The Panel noted:
The principle of non-intervention in internal aﬀairs cannot be used to protect
genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international
humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing, which can properly be considered a
threat to international security and as such provoke action by the Security Council.43
This language was further modiﬁed in the World Summit Outcome
Document. It tied the trigger of R2P expressly to accepted labels of
‘‘crimes’’. Paragraph 138 states that ‘‘each individual State has the
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’’.44 This framing placed
the focus on protection of civilians from speciﬁc crimes. Response to
natural disasters was discussed outside the ambit of R2P.
The Secretary-General defended the move towards a ‘‘justice-
oriented’’ trigger as follows:
To try to extend it to cover other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or
the response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch
the concept beyond recognition or operational utility.45
This approach was later partially conﬁrmed in the ILC Draft Articles
on Protection of Persons in the Event of Natural Disasters which
build on elements of R2P but omit an express reference to the con-
cept.46
42 Ibid., para. 203.
43 Ibid., para. 200.
44 See para. 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document.
45 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect’,
UN. Doc A/63/677, 12 January 2009, para. 10 (b).
46 See ILC Report on the Work of its 61st Session, UN. Doc, A/64/10, para. 164
(‘‘Agreement was expressed with the Special Rapporteur’s conclusions on the non-
applicability of the concept of responsibility to protect, although some expressed the
view that any such decision by the Commission should not prejudice the possible
relevance of the concept in the future’’). See also ILC, Second report on the pro-
tection of persons in the event of disasters, A/CN.4/615, 7 May 2009, para. 8 (‘‘a
rights-based approach to the topic was supported by various delegations, while some
expressed doubts as to whether such was the correct path to be followed in this case.
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The choice may be explained by a number of pragmatic consid-
erations.47 The ‘‘atrocity-crime’’ based trigger has appeal since it is
neither ‘‘too high’’ nor to ‘‘too low’’.48 It reﬂects a strategic choice to
keep the scope of R2P narrow at the outset, in particular due to its
nexus to exemptions from non-intervention.49 It provides a ‘‘tangible
threshold’’ for action.50 It ties response schemes to widespread vio-
lence and civil unrest, in particular ‘‘the deliberate targeting of
speciﬁc groups, communities or populations […] and sometimes cy-
cles of reaction and counter-reaction between communities’’.51 The
requirement of ‘‘manifest failure’’ in paragraph 139 raises the
threshold for ‘‘outside invention’’. Some argue that this framing is
deemed to exclude small-scale war crimes, or even ‘‘slow-motion’’
crimes against humanity, such as institutionalized apartheid, disap-
pearances and sexual violence, which may occur without widespread
conﬂict and internal disruption.52 The existing formulation further
Footnote 46 continued
Similarly, while the relevance of a ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ still remained unclear
for several delegations, some delegations considered that the Commission should not
ﬁnd itself prevented from considering that notion, should the logic of its undertaking
propel it in that direction’’). For a discussion, see T. Allan and T. O’Donnell, A Call
to Alms?: Natural Disasters, R2P, Duties of Cooperation and Uncharted Conse-
quences’ (2012) 17 Journal of Conﬂict & Security Law 337. See also generally G.
Evans, The Responsibility to Protect in Environmental Emergencies’ (2009) 103
Proceedings of the 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Society ofInternational Law
27–32; A. McLachlan-Bent and J. Langmore, A Crime against Humanity? Impli-
cations and Prospects of the Responsibility to Protect in the Wake of Cyclone
Nargis’ (2011) 3 Global Responsibility to Protect 37.
47 For a discussion, see D. Scheﬀer, Atrocity Crimes: Framing the Responsibility
to Protect’ (2007–2008) 40 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 111.
48 See also Me´gret (n 9 above), at 31.
49 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect’ (n
45 above), para. 10 (c) (‘‘While the scope should be kept narrow, the response ought
to be deep’’).
50 Note that crimes trigger leaves uncertainties. There are, for instance, signiﬁcant
disputes over the reach of crimes against humanity. See e.g., C. Kress, On the Outer
Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy
Requirement: Some Reﬂections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision’ (2010) 23
Leiden Journal of International Law 855; T. Rodenhauser, Beyond State Crimes:
Non-State Entities and Crimes Against Humanity’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of In-
ternational Law 913.
51 See Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility to protect: State respon-
sibility and prevention’, UN. Doc. A/67/929–S/2013/399, 9 July 2013, para 12.
52 Scheﬀer (n 24 above), 86–92.
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enhances the normative force of R2P. It grounds it in precedent, such
as the ‘‘right’’ of the African Union ‘‘to intervene … in respect to
grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity’’.53 This is deemed to mitigate (neo-)imperial cri-
tiques of R2P.
These pragmatic reasons are complemented by other grounds that
go beyond rational choice. The crime-based’ trigger has emotional
attraction since it limits moral opposition to R2P. The label of
atrocity crimes’ (e.g., genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing) is associated with a social stigma that makes it harder to
oppose its invocation. It embraces conduct that impossible to justify
in situations of conﬂict. As Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon put it in
2009,
…no community, society, or culture publicly and oﬃcially condones genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity as acceptable behaviour.54
Moreover, the crime-label has attraction since it provides a legal
backing against political and moral challenges to R2P. Linking the
concept to the duty to investigate and prosecute under international
law tempers the space of the political’ in human security responses.55
It frames R2P action as a matter of necessity, rather than an act of
choice.
2.3 The ‘‘Honeymoon’’ Period
The relationship between R2P and international criminal justice was
clariﬁed in the aftermath of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document. The 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on Imple-
menting the Responsibility to Protect’ set out what one might call the
honeymoon period in the newly formed relationship.
53 Art 4 of Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union provides for:
‘‘(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of
the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity’’. For a study, see D. Kuwali, The Responsibility to Protect:
Implementation of Article 4(h) Intervention (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
54 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect’, (n
43 above), para. 20.
55 On the space of the political’ in international criminnal justice, see W. Werner
and S. Nouwen, Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in
Uganda and Sudan’ (2010) 21 EJIL 941.
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The report arranged the current pillar structure of R2P and shifted
the emphasis from coercive intervention to prevention and other
softer institutional responses to crisis within the UN system. It
claimed that R2P ‘‘seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it’’
and ‘‘help States to succeed, not just to react when they fail’’.56
The report grounded essential elements of R2P in law, rather than
politics. It noted that ‘‘provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the
Summit Outcome are ﬁrmly anchored in well-established principles of
international law’’.57 It stressed the mutually reinforcing nature of
R2P and international criminal justice. It argued that R2P provides
conditions that facilitate a better enforcement of international crim-
inal justice. It claimed that causes of mass atrocities can be mitigated
through international institutional responses, such as ‘‘preventive
diplomacy’’ or ‘‘capacity-building’’.
This institutional logic and its conﬁdence in the conﬂict resolution
potential of UN mechanisms is reﬂected in the statement that:
[g]enocide and other crimes relating to the responsibility to protect do not just
happen. They are, more often than not, the result of a deliberate and calculated
political choice, and of the decisions and actions of political leaders who are all too
ready to take advantage of existing social divisions and institutional failures …They
are neither inevitable nor unavoidable.58
The report applied this functionalist approach to international
criminal justice. It openly characterized international justice as a tool
for implementing the goals of R2P. It branded the Rome Statute
expressly as ‘‘one of the key instruments relating to the responsibility
to protect’’.59 It recognized the preventive function of international
criminal courts and tribunals. It notes:
By seeking to end impunity, the International Criminal Court and the United Na-
tions-assisted tribunals have added an essential tool for implementing the responsi-
bility to protect, one that is already reinforcing eﬀorts at dissuasion and deterrence.60
56 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the responsibility to protect’,
(n 45 above), para 10.
57 Ibid., para. 3.
58 Ibid., para. 21.
59 Ibid., para. 19.
60 Ibid., para. 18.
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It then identiﬁed diﬀerent means and strategies through international
criminal justice may strengthen R2P. It makes reference to (i) the
principle of complementarity, in particular the role of ‘‘national ju-
dicial processes’’ as ‘‘the ﬁrst line of defence against impunity’’,61 (ii)
the need for national implementing legislation, in order to ensure
‘‘that the four speciﬁed crimes and violations and their incitement are
criminalized under domestic law and practice’’62 and (iii) the role of
preventive diplomacy, i.e. calls to hold ‘‘political and community
leaders … accountable for violations of international law’’ at ‘‘their
instigation’’.63
The report transformed R2P from a humanitarian doctrine into a
conﬂict resolution technique. It linked the operationalization of R2P
expressly to strategies of ‘‘capacity-building’’. It noted that:
Responsible sovereignty … entails the building of institutions, capacities and prac-
tices for the constructive management of the tensions so often associated with the
uneven growth or rapidly changing circumstances that appear to beneﬁt some groups
more than others.64
This framing resonated well with existing weaknesses of international
criminal justice. International criminal justice has suﬀered from se-
lectivity problems and enforcement gaps since it its inception. It has
been in search of an overarching theory that bolsters its moral au-
thority and increases pressure for compliance of States. R2P oﬀered a
new prospect to mitigate those dilemmas.
The managerial approach to justice coincided with the increasing
focus on deferral of international authority and strengthening of
domestic jurisdiction in the context of the completion strategy of the
ad hoc tribunals.65 The protective function of R2P provided authority
for an increased focus on outreach, capacity-building and restorative
approaches to victims in the activities of the tribunals.66 It allowed
61 Ibid., para. 19.
62 Ibid., para. 17.
63 Ibid., para. 55.
64 Ibid., para. 14.
65 See D. Raab, Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy: Eﬀorts to
Achieve Accountability for War Crimes and their Tribunals’ (2005) 3 JICJ 82; K.
J. Heller, Completion’ in L. Reydams, J. Wouter and C. Ryngaert (eds.), Interna-
tional Prosecutors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 886.
66 In the ICC context, this is reﬂected in the idea of the Trust Fund for Victims. On
resources, see M. Wierda and A. Triolo, Resources’, in Reydams, Wouter and
Ryngaert (eds.), (n 63 above), 113. For a discussion of outreach, see J. N. Clark,
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the tribunals to claim vis-a`-vis the UN that these areas form part of
the inherent mandate of international criminal jurisdictions.67
The conception of R2P presented in the report also strengthened
strategies developed in the ﬁrst practice of the ICC. Due to its strong
dependence on States in relation to jurisdiction, cooperation and evi-
dence, the Court has been described as a ‘‘giant without legs’’ since its
inception.68 This challenge has prompted a need for institutional cre-
ativity and a search for new approaches to make the ICC relevant in
international relations. It resulted in a number of innovations: (i) the
development of new alert functions, i.e. the use of preliminary ex-
aminationas a tool to ﬂagviolations andmobilize international action,69
(ii) the increased emphasis onnational responsibility70 and (iii) thedesign
of strategies to act ‘‘in partnership’’ with States and encourage domestic
Footnote 66 continued
a˚International War Crimes Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach’ (2009) Inter-
national Criminal Law Review 99; R. Hodzˇic´, Living the Legacy of Mass Atrocities:
Victims’ Perspectives on War Crimes Trials’ (2010) 8 JICJ 113. For a study of
capacity building, see E. Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law:
Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks’ (2009) 50 Boston
College Law Review 1; D. Tolbert and A. Kontic´, The International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia: Transitional Justice, the Transfer of Cases and
Lessons for the ICC’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the
International Criminal Court (Leiden: Brill, 2009) 135–162; M. Bergsmo, O. Bekou &
A. Jones, Complementarity After Kampala: Capacity Building and the ICC’s Legal
Tools’ (2010) 2 Goettingen Journal of International Law 791.
67 For a skeptical take, see R. Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International
Tribunals’ (2994) 2 JICJ 541.
68 On the origin of the image, see A. Cassese, On the Current Trends towards
Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian
Law’ (1998) 9 EJIL 13.
69 OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Documents/
OTP%20Preliminary%20Examinations/OTP%20-%20Policy%20Paper%20Preliminary
%20Examinations%20%202013.pdf. For analysis, see P. Seils, Making Complemen-
tarity Work: Maximizing the Limited Role of the Prosecutor’, in Stahn and El Zeidy
(eds.), (n 18 above) 989–1013.
70 Para. 1 of the Kampala Review Conference Resolution on complementarity
[r]ecognizes the primary responsibility of States to investigate and prosecute the
most serious crimes of international concern’. See Resolution RC/Res.1, 8 June 2010,
para. 1.
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investigation and prosecution (‘‘positive complementarity’’, ‘‘reverse
cooperation’’71). These strategies were set out in the Report on Prose-
cutorial Strategy (2009–2012) which stated that ‘‘much of thework done
to achieve the goals of the Statute may take place in national judiciary
around theworld’’,while cautioning that ‘‘thenumberof cases that reach
the Court is not a positive measure of eﬀectiveness’’.72
R2P provided to some extent the missing piece in the construction
of complementarity. The Rome Statute operates on the implicit as-
sumption that states have a duty to investigate and prosecute.73 But it
failed to spell out the origin of this obligation and a duty to imple-
ment core crimes.74 The articulation of R2P ﬁlled this authority gap,
through its principled recognition of the duty to prevent and punish
and the role of domestic jurisdiction as ‘‘ﬁrst port of entry’’ (para.
138). The response options under R2P (para. 139) provided addi-
tional leverage to use complementarity as a ‘‘catalyst for compliance’’
in ICC strategy.75 The assistance’ pillar of R2P provided additional
authority to strengthen the importance of domestication of ICC
norms and procedures76 and to defend a nexus between the ICC and
development strategies.77
71 See OTP, Informal expert paper, The principle of complementarity in practice’
(2003), paras. 7–15, at http://www.iclklamberg.com/Caselaw/OTP/Informal%20
Expert%20paper%20The%20principle%20of%20complementarity%20in%20practice.
pdf. On reverse cooperation’, see F. Gioia, Complementarity and ‘‘Reverse Coop-
eration’’’, in Stahn and El Zeidy (eds.), (n 19 above) 807–828.
72 See OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009–2012, 1 February 2010, para. 79, paras.
16–17, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-D229D
1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf.
73 See 6th preambular paragraph of the ICC Statute, ‘‘[r]ecalling that it is the duty
of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for inter-
national crimes’’.
74 An express duty exists only in relation to cooperation. See Art. 88 of the ICC
Statute (‘‘States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their
national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are speciﬁed under this Part’’).
75 See generally J. K. Kleﬀner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National
Criminal Jurisdictions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Chapter 7.
76 See Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Pro-
tect, (n 45 above), para. 44 (‘‘What is most needed, from the perspective of the
responsibility to protect, are assistance programmes that are carefully targeted to
build speciﬁc capacities within societies that would make them less likely to travel the
path to crimes relating to the responsibility to protect’’).
77 For a critical account, see S. Kendall, Donors’ Justice: Recasting International
Criminal Accountability’ (2011) 24 LJIL 585. On development and transitional
justice, see R. Duthie, ’Towards a Development-sensitive Approach to Transitional
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III A MARRIAGE WITHOUT CONTRACT
The problem of the conception of R2P in the 2009 report is that it is
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. R2P was formulated loose
and ﬂexible enough to facilitate that merger. It provided a call for
action and a duty to react. It mandates, as Jennifer Welsh put it, that
mass atrocity situations be identiﬁed, and that action be taken, but it
‘‘does not specify precisely what kind of action is appropriate’’.78
This construction may oﬀer some beneﬁts in relation to the dis-
course on intervention, since it protects the integrity of the concept in
cases where it is abusively invoked to justify a speciﬁc response
scheme to a crisis (e.g., military intervention). But it also comes with
downsides. It packaged a wide range of responses under a common
umbrella, without paying tribute to their individual functions and
distinctions.79
The report embraced a broader trend within the UN system to
conceptualize human rights bodies, humanitarian action and insti-
tutions of criminal justice as part of a common response strategy to
atrocity crimes. It presents diverse actors, such as fact-ﬁnding mis-
sions, human rights bodies, peace operations and international
criminal courts and tribunals as members of a ‘‘happy’’ community of
institutions that act in concert for the common goal of preventing and
ending mass atrocities. It assumed that they serve as conﬂict resolu-
tion mechanisms.
This approach has triggered diﬀerent types of criticisms. In the
human rights community, R2P has been criticized for its selectivity
and under-inclusion. The crimes trigger strengthens the alert function
of human rights mechanisms. But it poses constraints from a conﬂict
Footnote 77 continued
Justice’ (2008) 2 IJTJ 294; P. de Greiﬀ and R. Duthie (eds.), Transitional Justice and
Development: Making the Connection (New York: Social Science Research Council,
June 2009).
78 See J. Welsh, Where R2P Goes From Here’, 21 August 2013, http://
opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/interviews/where-r2p-goes-from-here/.
79 For a similar claim in relation to complementarity in the ICC context, see F.
Me´gret, Too Much of a Good Thing? Implementation and the Uses of Comple-
mentarity’, in Stahn and El Zeidy (eds.), (n 19 above), 361, at 364.
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resolution perspective. It makes R2P ‘‘thin’’80, rather than ‘‘narrow’’
and ‘‘deep’’.81 The crime trigger associates protection needs mostly
with political violence. It privileges speciﬁc human rights protections,
i.e. the right to life and bodily integrity, and civil and political rights,
more broadly, to the detriment of socio-economic rights (e.g., wel-
fare, health).82 It makes it harder to invoke the loss of sovereignty as
a shield in cases of human rights abuses that do not amount to
atrocity crimes. It is reductionist since it reduces the complexity of
social realities into the rudimentary language of criminal law.
Moreover, it poses some ideological challenges that hamper en-
forcement. The reference to crimes and the link to State failure attach
particular stigmas to the application of R2P that impede its accep-
tance by deﬁant States and its use as a non-coercive tool. 83
In the international criminal justice community, R2P is criticized
for its over-inclusiveness as to the functions of justice. The crime-
based deﬁnition of R2P has reinforced the trend of human rights
bodies to make ﬁndings on international criminal violations. In
particular, fact-ﬁndings mechanisms have increasingly focused on
‘‘atrocity crimes’’ over the past decade.84 This has led to divergent
approaches towards the application of substantive international
criminal law85 and concerns about due process standards (e.g., in
80 See D. Chandler R2P or Not R2P? More Statebuilding, Less Responsibility’
(2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 161, 165 (‘‘This liberal institutional ap-
proach understands mass atrocities outside of a concern with economic and social
relations, focusing merely on the institutional structures which are held to shape the
behaviour of individuals’’).
81 See Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Pro-
tect, (n 45 above), para. 10 (c).
82 See generally E. Schmid, Taking Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Seriously
in International Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
83 See Chandler, (n 80 above), 164 (arguing that R2P presents ‘‘weak institutional
capacity of some sovereign states’’ as a problem).
84 See L. van den Herik, An Inquiry into the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in
International Law: Navigating the Tensions between Fact-Finding and Application
of International Law’ (2014) 13 Chinese Journal of International Law 507.
85 See e.g., L. van den Herik and C. Harwood, Sharing the Law: The Appeal of
International Criminal Law for International Commissions of Inquiry’, Grotius
Centre Working Paper No. 2014/016-ICL, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2387554; T. Rodenhauser, Progressive Development of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law: The Reports of the Independent International Com-
mission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, EJIL Talk, http://www.ejiltalk.org/
progressive-development-of-international-human-rights-law-the-reports-of-the-
independent-international-commission-of-inquiry-on-the-syrian-arab-republic/.
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relation to naming of individual suspects) and investigative
methodologies (e.g., protection of witnesses and victims) of human
rights fact-ﬁnders.86
More fundamentally, the 2009 report has embraced a ‘‘ﬁt-all’’
conception of justice that is increasingly under challenge. It treated
international criminal justice as a tool of conﬂict resolution,87 with-
out engaging with the roles and limits of justice institutions.88 The
report failed to recognize that goals of justice do not necessarily
coincide with the goals of with humanitarian action. It assumed that
international criminal justice institutions have a preventive function,
without engaging with the conditions under what such eﬀects may
occur.89 It took it for granted that a greater managerial role of in-
ternational courts and tribunals is conducive to the goals of pro-
tecting R2P. It failed to examine whether such an approach is
conducive to the goals of justice. R2P and international criminal
justice are not ‘‘always mutually reinforcing’’.90 The report paid in-
suﬃcient attention to the fundamental question whether and to what
extent a greater operational role of international courts and tribunals
under R2P may be reconciled with prerequisites of judicial and
86 D. Saxon, Purpose and Legitimacy in International Fact-Finding Bodies’, in
M. Bergsmo (ed.), Quality Contril in Fact-Finding (Torkel Opsahl Academic
EPublisher, 2013) 211, 222–224; T. Boutruche, Credible Fact-Finding and Allega-
tions of International Humanitarian Law Violations: Challenges in Theory and
Practice’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conﬂict and SecurityLaw 108.
87 For the recognition of a pragmatic link, see K. A. Rodman, Justice as a Dia-
logue Between Law and Politics’ (2014) 12 JICJ 437, 469 (‘‘pragmatism requires the
Prosecutor to construe her discretion as part of a dialogue, both with stakeholders
likely to be aﬀected by criminal proceedings, and with the international actors in-
volved in conﬂict resolution, peace-building, and humanitarian activities’’).
88 For a careful appraisal of the functions of international criminal justice, see R.
Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinsin and E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International
Criminal Law and Procedure, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)
28–42; M. Damaska, What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice’ (2008) 83
Chicago-Kent Law Review 329; S. Dana, The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the
International Criminal Court Engage with Consequentialist Aspirations? (2014) 3
Penn State Journal of Law and International Aﬀairs 30.
89 See generally P. Akhavan, Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities? (2001) 95 LJIL 7; J. Ku and J. Nzelibe, Do International Criminal
Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?’ (2006) 84 Washington
University Law Review 777; L. Vinjamuri, Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit
of International Justice’ (2010) 24 Ethics & International Aﬀairs 191.
90 See also Roland Paris, R2P v. ICC’, 24 June 2011, at http://opencanada.org/
features/r2p-v-icc/.
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prosecutorial independence, as well as standards of fairness and im-
partiality of judicial behavior. No attempt was made to improve in-
teraction between existing institutions, i.e. to work towards a better
connection between international criminal justice institutions and
other response mechanisms. The Secretary General urged the Per-
manent Members to ‘‘refrain from employing or threatening to em-
ploy the veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations
relating to the responsibility to protect’’.91 But the crucial working
relationship between the Security Council and the ICC remained
largely unaddressed.
This may explain why there is gap between narrative and reality.
R2P has been invoked on numerous occasions in the context of hu-
man rights fact-ﬁnding. Several fact-ﬁnding missions have concluded
that the concerned state failed to exercise its responsibility to protect
its population (Syria, Kenya)92 and that the international community
has a duty to act (Syria, North Korea).93 Commissions of Inquiry
have recommended international criminal accountability responses,
such as referral by the Security Council to the ICC (Darfur, Guinea,
Syria, North Korea),94 exercise of universal jurisdiction (High-level
91 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, (n
45 above), para. 61.
92 For instance, the International Commission of Inquiry on Syria (Syria Com-
mission’) held that the Syrian Government had ‘‘manifestly failed in its responsibility
to protect the population’’. See Report of the Independent International Commis-
sion of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/69, 22 February
2012, para. 126. An OHCHR fact-ﬁnding mission in Kenya in 2008 reported that the
State had failed to meet its responsibility to protect its population. See Report from
OHCHR Fact-ﬁnding Mission to Kenya, 6–28 February 2008, at 12.
93 For instance, the 2014 report of the North Korea Commission reported that
‘‘[t]he international community must accept its responsibility to protect the people of
the [North Korea] from crimes against humanity, because the Government […] has
manifestly failed to do so.’’ Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63, 7 February
2014, para. 86. In 2013, the Syria Commission underlined the responsibility of the
international community ‘‘in the search for peace and the commitment to interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law.’’ Report of the Independent Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/
59, 5 February 2013, para. 171.
94 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 25 January 2005,
paras. 571–589 and 647, at http://www.unrol.org/ﬁles/com_inq_darfur.pdf; Report
of the International Commission of Inquiry Mandated to Establish the Facts and
Circumstances of the Events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea, UN Doc. S/2009/693,
18 December 2009, para. 266; Syria Commission, (n 92 above), para. 180(b); North
Korea Commission, (n 92 above), para. 94(a).
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Mission on Darfur, Goldstone Commission)95 or the establishment of
ad hoc international tribunals.
International justice institutions have kept a critical distance in
oﬃcial discourse. They remained reluctant to apply R2P as a legal
concept. The International Court of Justice had the opportunity to
refer to R2P in the Genocide cases,96 but refrained from invoking it in
a notable fashion in jurisprudence. A similar picture prevails in the
ICC context. The concept has been applied incrementally. It was
mentioned by the ICC Prosecutor97 and delegates (e.g., Sweden, Ja-
pan) in statements.98 But it has thus far not played a key role in
judicial decisions or motions, although it could have been invoked in
contexts such as Kenya, Libya or Darfur.
The lack of reference to R2P may be partly explained by doubts
about the normative quality of R2P.99 But the causes of problems lie
deeper.
IV DISCOURSE AND RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS
The crisis in the relationship between R2P and international criminal
justice is grounded in discourse problems and false premises of in-
teraction. The normative appeal of R2P as a concept has been
95 Report of the High-Level Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur,
UN Doc. A/HRC/4/80, 9 March 2007, para. 77(i); Report of the UN Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conﬂict, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009, para.
1975.
96 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Reports
2007 43; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), 3 February 2015, at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
ﬁles/118/18422.pdf.
97 See Luis Moreno Ocampo, Keynote Address, 17 November 2006, Chicago,
Illinois, at http://r2pcoalition.org/content/view/61/86/, arguing that there is ‘‘com-
mon ground’’ between R2P and the ICC, ‘‘because the scheme envisioned by the
Responsibility to Protect where each individual State has the primary responsibility
to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity, including the prevention of such crimes, and the idea that the
international community will only step in when a State is failing to do is very much
the scheme retained in Rome for the International Criminal Court, the same concept,
including the gravity threshold retained for the Responsibility to Protect is also close
to our own legal standards under the Rome Statute’’.
98 See M. Contarino and M. Negron-Gonzales, The International Criminal
Court’, in Zyberi, (n 1 above), 411, 413.
99 In UN documents, R2P is understood as a concept’, principle,’ or standard’.
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overshadowed by its use as a tool of intervention. Instead of
beneﬁting from the invocation of sovereignty as responsibility, in-
ternational criminal justice has been aﬀected by some of the very
same critiques that have been voiced against R2P.
There are three fundamental factors that have compromised the
interplay between international criminal justice and R2P: (i) an
overambitious link between consequentialist approaches to justice
and human security agendas, (ii) declining faith in the nexus of in-
ternational criminal justice and R2P to collective security, and (iii)
problems related to the use of punitive rationales as a justiﬁcation for
intervention.
4.1 Misalignment Between Justice and Human Security Agendas
Some of the common ground that has traditionally been assumed in
relation to the interplay between R2P and international criminal
justice has faded. The alliance between the two concepts was based on
the assumption that it is useful to combine justice and human security
agendas. The branding of R2P as conﬂict resolution mechanism and
the reference to Courts as ‘‘tools’’ in this box have provided an in-
centive to portray international criminal court and tribunals as hu-
man security actors.
This conception is tempting for international criminal justice. It
helps to put accountability dilemmas on the radar on the short-run
and may secure some quick-wins. But it has visible downsides from a
systemic and long-term perspective. It has transformed courts from
judicial entities into managerial actors and exposed to them to some
the same dilemmas that ‘‘outside’’ actors face when proclaiming to
protect ‘‘the rights of others’’.
These dilemmas have become particularly apparent in the context
of the ﬁrst practice of the ICC. Much of the rhetoric of early ICC
action has revolved around security agendas and consequentialist
considerations. Prosecutorial strategy has overemphasized the role of
the ICC in crisis management. Some of the strategies were primarily
guided at eﬀecting societal and political transformation through the
vehicle of justice. This has reversed cause and eﬀect. Human security
may be well a consequence or side-eﬀect of justice intervention. But
choices related to the investigation and prosecution of crimes should
not be primarily guided by human security concerns.
The ﬁrst practice of the ICC has turned this logic around.
Speculation about calculated political and societal outcomes have
been at the forefront of strategies and decision-making practice. In
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the context of Uganda,100 ICC action was visibly guided at improving
security conditions, caused through the moves of the LRA.101 The
Prosecutor portrayed the role of the ICC as security agent and
‘‘savior’’ of the interests of Ugandan society. Some of the ﬁrst draft
press releases of the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor were directed to the
‘‘people of Uganda’’. Arrests warrants were geared at insulating the
LRA leadership, in order to cause internal division and dismantle
LRA structures. But this strategy failed to produce the desired con-
sequences. When arrest and prosecution strategies did not bear fruit,
provision about information about declining crime rates in Uganda
became a focal point of submissions. After the failure of Juba peace
talks, the situation lay virtually dormant until the capture of Dominic
Onwgen.102
In Kenya, speculation about election politics became a prime
objective of justice intervention.103 The engagement of the ICC was
100 See generally T. Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the
Lord’s Resistance Army (London: Zed Books, 2006); M. Wierda and M. Otim,
Courts, Conﬂict and Complementarity in Uganda, in Stahn and El Zeidy, (n 19
above) 1155–1178; P. Clark, ’Chasing Cases: The ICC and the Politics of State
Referral in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda’, in Stahn and El Zeidy
(eds.), (n 19 above) 1180–1202. For a discussion, see also Nouwen, (n 9 above), at
56–59.
101 For statistics on quantitative analysis of the deterrence impact’, see J. Mendez,
The Importance of Justice in Securing Peace’, 18 May 2010, at http://www.icc-cpi.
int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Stocktaking/The%20Importance%20of%20Justice%
20in%20Securing%20Peace.pdf.
102 Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Ben-
souda, following the surrender and transfer of top LRA Commander Dominic
Ongwen, 21 January 2015, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20
media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-stat-21-01-2015.aspx (arguing that ‘‘Dominic
Ongwen’s transfer brings us one step closer to ending the LRA’s reign of terror in the
African Great Lakes region’’). For a discussion, see A. Whiting, Is a Plea Agreement
for Dominic Ongwen a Good Idea?’, 10 February 2015, at http://postconﬂict
justice.com/is-a-plea-agreement-for-dominic-ongwen-a-good-idea/.
103 See generally S. Brown, Lessons Learned and Forgotten: The International
Community and Electoral Conﬂict Management in Kenya’, in D. Gillies (ed.)
Elections in Dangerous Places: Democracyand the Paradoxes of Peacebuilding
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University, 2011) 127–143; C. Alai and N. Mue, Com-
plementarity and the Impact of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal
Court in Kenya’, in Stahn and El Zeidy (eds.), (n 19 above) 1222–1233; S. Ho¨hn,
New Start or False Start? The ICC and Electoral Violence in Kenya’, (2014) 45
Development and Change 565–588.
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partly driven by the goal to send a message that election violence is
impermissible on the African continent, and elsewhere in the world.
Charges were partly geared at ‘‘rebuild[ing] Kenya on new founda-
tions’’104 and ‘‘provid[ing] an example on how to do justice, protect
victims and overcome massive conﬂicts’’.105 As Luis Moreno-O-
campo admitted later openly, ICC action was guided by the ambition
to transform ‘‘transform Kenya into Sweden’’.106 ICC strategies and
cases were chosen on that premise, making a link between the 2007
electoral violence and prevention of violence in subsequent elec-
tions.107 The reliance on calculated eﬀects was then used as a tech-
nique to validate ICC intervention.108 The peaceful holding of the
2013 elections was branded as success of ICC action. This strategy
triggered vast public mobilization (‘‘Don’t be vague, go to the The
Hague’). But it masked problems relating to evidence gathering and
actual delivery of justice in the Courtroom. Moreover, the calculus
inherent in the ICC claim remained fragile. It sidelined the fact that
political violence in Kenya had origins in longer term disputes over
land resources and access to politics which cannot be solved through
criminal charges.109
A similar rationale was used in the context of Ivory Coast. In
November 2004, Juan Mendez, former UN Advisor on the Preven-
tion of Genocide, made a statement that public incitement to violence
would come within the ambit of ICC jurisdiction, which was branded
as ‘‘anecdotal evidence that the threat of prosecution in some cases
104 See OTP Statement, Press Conference by the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, Thursday November 26, 2009, Nairobi and
The Hague’, at 1, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A2B59665-397C-4C47-
9CFA-18958E6AB28C/281313/LMOINTROstatement26112009_2_2.pdf.
105 Ibid., at 2.
106 See Interview, 22 January 2014, at http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/ocampo-
exclusive.
107 See OTP Statement, (n 104 above), at 3 (‘‘It has been two years since the post-
election violence in Kenya. In two years, another election is planned. The world is
watching Kenya and this Court. We cannot fail the women, men and children of
Kenya’’).
108 See International Crisis Group, Kenya: Impact of the ICC Proceedings’,
Policy Brief, Africa Brieﬁng N84 Nairobi/Brussels, 9 January 2012, at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/B084%20Kenya
%20——%20Impact%20of%20the%20ICC%20Proceedings.pdf.
109 See Ho¨hn, (n 103 above), at 572.
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can stay the hand of the perpetrators of mass atrocities’’.110 In De-
cember 2010, the ICC Prosecutor invoked the 2003 declaration of
acceptance of jurisdiction in December 2010 in order to curtail vio-
lence in presidential elections. Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda
issued a statement that illustrates the human security oriented ra-
tionale of ICC scrutiny. It reads like a UN press release: ‘‘I urge
supporters of the candidates and security forces to refrain from
violence’’.111 This strategy is appealing from a rhetorical point of
view. But it has something ambivalent. It reduces the complexity of
social reality by suggesting that electoral violence can be reduced to
ﬁghts of individuals over political interests.112
Speculation about political outcomes further inﬂuenced the timing
of ICC decision-making processes. In the Columbian situation, the
Prosecutor deferred its decision to act under Article 15, in order to
await the outcome of peace negotiations and the operation of the
Peace and Justice Law.113 In the Palestine context, the Oﬃce tied its
decision on the (non-)exercise of jurisdiction following the 2009
declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction under Article 12 (3) to UN
moves in the General Assembly,114 which prompted criticism as to
110 See J. Mendez, Justice and Prevention’, in Stahn and El Zeidy (eds.), (n 19
above), 33, at 47.
111 See Statement by the Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC on situation in Cote
d’Ivoire, 2 December 2010.
112 Ho¨hn, (n 103 above), at 582.
113 For a critique, see Seils, (n 69 above), at 1011 (‘‘That patience, ﬁve years after
writing to Colombia in March 2005, has not been vindicated in terms of encouraging
genuine national proceedings. Nor has it been vindicated in terms of deterring se-
rious crimes’’).
114 In the Update on the Situation in Palestine, issued on 3 April 2012, i.e. almost
three years after the Palestinian declaration, the OTP stated that ‘‘competence for
determining the term State’ within the meaning of article 12 rests, in the ﬁrst in-
stance, with the United Nations Secretary General who, in case of doubt, will defer




externalization of authority and undue delay.115 In both contexts, this
risk-management strategy came at some cost in relation to the per-
ception of the impartiality and eﬀectiveness of justice. In the Libyan
context, the ICC acted much more quickly than in other situations. It
decided within a couple of days to initiate investigations.116 This was
visibly geared at de-legitimizing the Gaddaﬁ-regime. After the fall of
the regime, the Prosecutor took a U-turn. The OTP adopted a hands-
oﬀ approach, and disengaged from investigations and prosecution,
because of faith in the capacity of the Libyan people.117
One of the lessons of the ﬁrst decade of the ICC is that it is risky to
rely on calculated political eﬀects to motivate prosecutorial choices.
Placing human security concerns at the center of justice-related de-
cision-making processes is likely to result in disappointment and
failure. It might ultimately lead to a mission creep of international
criminal justice. Viewing international criminal justice as a project to
build responsible sovereignty is overambitious. It reverses priorities.
International criminal justice may certainly entail the incapacitation
of political leaders, and might improve security or societal conditions.
But such eﬀects should not be turned into the primary agenda. They
inevitably expose international criminal justice to critiques and
dilemmas of intervention and imperialism.
115 For critical assessment, see J. Dugard, Palestine and the International Crim-
inal Court Institutional Failure or Bias?’ (2013) 11 JICJ 563. On 16 January, a
preliminary examination was opened, more than two years after the adoption of
Resolution 67/19 by the General Assembly which granted Palestine non-member
observer State’ status in the UN on 29 November 2012. See OTP Press Release, The
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a pre-
liminary examination of the situation in Palestine’ , ICC-OTP-20150116-PR1083, 16
January 2015, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%
20releases/Pages/pr1083.aspx.
116 On 26 February 2011, the UN Security Council referred the situation on Libya
to the ICC. On 28 February 2011, the Prosecutor opened the preliminary ex-
amination. See OTP, Statement by the Oﬃce of the Prosecutor on situation in
Libya’, 28 February 2011, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of
%20the%20court/oﬃce%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20statements/
statement/Pages/statementlybia28022011.aspx.
117 For an analysis, see C. Stahn, Libya, the ICC and Complementarity: A Test
for ’shared responsibility’ (2012) 10 JICJ 325–351.
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4.2 Breakdown of Faith in the Nexus to Collective Security
A second strand of problems arises in relation to the role of the
Security Council. International justice and R2P were created based
on faith in the virtues of collective security. There was initial trust
that a constructive marriage’ between justice and R2P could unfold
under the umbrella of UN peace maintenance. Security Council ac-
tion was seen as an ideal type of collective response under R2P118 and
as an opportunity to overcome the limitations of the ICC.119 But this
conﬁdence has waned. Both, international criminal justice and R2P
have suﬀered from the alliance with Security Council practice. The
ICC and R2P become instruments of the UN Security Council and to
some extent a drop box for problems.120 This has damaged their
relationship.
International criminal justice was developed on the premise that
the cause of justice is strengthened by the link to collective security.
The Security Council was heralded as guardian of the ‘‘sanctity of
international justice’’ and humanitarianism. Both ideals have faded.
The ﬁrst referrals of the Security Council to the ICC were asso-
ciated with great hopes and expectations, and a certain sense of tri-
umph. There was a willingness to accept a certain sacriﬁce. But they
turned partly into poisoned gifts. The way in which have been han-
dled have left a sense of bitterness and disillusion.
As Louise Arbour, former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, has
noted in her fundamental critique of internationalism:
Two referrals by the Security Council to the ICC, in the cases of Darfur and Libya,
have done little to enhance the standing and credibility of the ICC, let alone con-
tribute to peace and reconciliation in their respective regions … Security Council
referrals expand the reach of accountability to countries that have chosen not to be
parties to the Rome Statute that established the ICC. But they do so at a cost that
any justice system should ﬁnd diﬃcult to bear… Security Council referrals… expose
118 See para. 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document.
119 In the drafting history of the Statute, only some states (Pakistan, India, United
Arab Emirates and Yemen) expressed criticism in relation to the power of the Se-
curity Council to refer situations to the ICC. See W. A. Schabas, The International
Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010) 295–296.
120 For an assessment, see J. Trahan, The Relationship between the International
Criminal Court and the UN Security Council: Parameters and Best Practices’ (2013)
24 CLF 417; D. Ruiz Verduzco, The UN Security Council and the International
Criminal Court’, Chatham House International Law Meeting Summary, 16 March
2012, at http://www.pgaction.org/pdf/activity/Chatham-ICC-SC.pdf.
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the Court to charges of politicisation, while providing the Court with no compen-
satory beneﬁts such as additional ﬁnancial, political or operational support.
[I]n the end, Council referrals may in fact underscore the Court’s impotence rather
than enhance its alleged deterrent eﬀect, given that in Darfur Security Council
backing has achieved so little, while in Libya there is a sense in some quarters that the
Court withdrew from a contentious arena leaving the indictees to be tried in a
judicial system under severe stress.121
Problems exist on several levels. The jurisdictional exemptions in ex-
isting Council resolutions,122 and the shift of the ﬁnancial burden of
referrals on the ICC despite the contrary assumption in Article 115
(b) of the Statute,123 limit the scope of investigations and the selection
of cases in the context of ICC referrals. This exposes the Court to
appearances of dependence or biaswhich aﬀect the independence of the
Court.124 When the ICC required Council support to enforce warrants
of arrest or deal with non-compliance by States with requests for co-
operation, it has been largely left in the dark.125 The Council notori-
ously failed to follow up on situations referred to the Court. Diﬃculties
were reinforcedby lackof transparencyor explanationof key aspects of
decisions, such as immunity exceptions or the use of Article 16.126
121 See L. Arbour, Doctrines Derailed?: Internationalism’s Uncertain Future’, at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2013/arbour-doctrines-
derailed-internationalism-s-uncertain-future.aspx.
122 See operative paragraph 6 of Resolution 1593 (2095) and 1970 (2011). For a
discussion, see R. Cryer, ’Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Jus-
tice’ (2006) 19 LJIL 195; Trahan, (n 120 above).
123 Article 115 (b) makes reference to ‘‘funds provided by the United Nations… in
particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security
Council’’.
124 On critiques by Arab and Latin and South American States against the role of
the Council, see Schabas, (n 118 above). Similar reservations have been voiced in the
context of the role of the Council in relation to the crime of aggression. As a result, it
is made clear that a ﬁnding of the Council shall have no prejudicial eﬀect on the ICC.
125 See e.g.. most recently ICC, PTC I, Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddaﬁ, ICC-
01/11-01/11, Decision on the non-compliance by Libya with requests for cooperation
by the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council, 10
December 2014, para. 34 (‘‘the Chamber is of the view that it is appropriate to make
a ﬁnding of non-compliance by Libya with the Court’s requests for cooperation at
issue and refer the matter to the Security Council under article 87(7) of the Statute
for it to consider any possible measure aimed at achieving Libya’s compliance with
its outstanding obligations vis-a`-vis the Court’’).
126 For an early illustration, see C. Stahn, The ambiguities of Security Council
Resolution 1422 (2002) (2003) 14 EJIL 85–104.
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As a result of these factors, there are serious doubts as to whether the
couplingof collective security and international justice has beenmutually
reinforcing in the ICC context. Some of these concerns have been openly
addressed by ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda in December 2014. She
noted in her statement on the situation in Darfur to the Council:
It is becoming increasingly diﬃcult for me to appear before you to update you when
all I am doing is repeating the same things I have said over and over again, most of
which are well known to this Council.…Women and girls continue to bear the brunt
of sustained attacks on innocent civilians. But this Council is yet to be spurred into
action. Victims of rapes are asking themselves how many more women should be
brutally attacked for this Council to appreciate the magnitude of their plight …
In the almost ten years that my Oﬃce has been reporting to this Council, there has
never been a strategic recommendation provided to my Oﬃce, neither have there
been any discussions resulting in concrete solutions for the problems we face in the
Darfur situation. We ﬁnd ourselves in a stalemate that can only embolden perpe-
trators to continue their brutality
Faced with an environment where my Oﬃce’s limited resources for investigations are
already overstretched, and given this Council’s lack of foresight on what should
happen in Darfur, I am left with no choice but to hibernate investigative activities in
Darfur as I shift resources to other urgent cases, especially those in which trial is
approaching. It should thus be clear to this Council that unless there is a change of
attitude and approach to Darfur in the near future, there shall continue to be little or
nothing to report to you for the foreseeable future.127
Similar doubts exist in relation to the relationship between the Council
and R2P. R2P was developed with the purpose to strengthen collective
security and curtail unilateral use of force. This ambition has suﬀered
from serious drawbacks. R2P has been declared ‘‘dead’’ after Syria.128
But the problems may not lie so much in the under-utilization of R2P
in relation to enforcement action, but in its instrumentalization.
From the perspective of systemic failure, Libya is in many ways a
worse scenario for R2P than Syria. In the Libyan context, R2P was
used in connection with the principle of the protection of civilians’ to
justify regime change.129 This logic turned the protection rationale of
127 See Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in
Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 12 December 2014, paras. 2–4, at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/stmt-20threport-darfur.pdf.
128 See n 7 above.
129 For a discussion, see M. Payandeh, The UN, Military Intervention, and Re-
gime Change in Libya’ (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 355; F.
K. Abiew and N. Gal-Or, Libya, Intervention and Responsibility: Sawn of a new
Era?, in C. Stahn and H. Melber (eds.), Peace Diplomacy, Global Justice and Inter-
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R2P on its head. It used a humanitarian label and an agenda of
protection to extend the limits of the use of force. It then ignored
protection needs in the aftermath of military intervention. This be-
havior had a spin-over eﬀect on international justice. It created the
impression that the ICC is the ‘‘prolonged arm’’ of the Security
Council and that its action is ‘‘intervention by other means.’’ 130 In
this sense, it damaged both: international criminal justice and R2P.
4.3 Use of Criminal Motives as a Justiﬁcation for Intervention
A third threat for the interplay between R2P and international
criminal justice is use of criminal rationales as a pretext for inter-
vention.131 This may be an unintended consequence of the merger
between justice and intervention agendas. It has detrimental eﬀects
on both concepts.
This tendency became acutely apparent in the Syrian crisis.132 The
discourse on the use of force mixed arguments of humanitarian
protection, in line with R2P, and rationales of criminal justice in
order to extend option for a military response. Humanitarianism was
invoked as a title to justify action that is punitive in nature, outside
the realm of self-defence133 or collective security. Use of force was
Footnote 129 continued
national Agency: Rethinking Human Security and Ethics in the Spirit of Dag
Hammarskjo¨ld (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 536–556.
130 See Stahn, (n 117 above), and C. Stahn, Why the ICC Should Be Cautious to
Use the Islamic State to Get Out of Africa: Part 1’, EJIL Talk, at
http://www.ejiltalk.org/why-the-icc-should-be-cautious-to-use-the-islamic-state-to-get-
out-of-africa-part-1/.
131 On narratives in intervention, see A. Orford, Reading Humanitarian Interven-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), C. Borgen, The Language of
Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determi-
nation in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia’ (2009) 10 Chicago Journal of
International Law 1.
132 For a full discussion, see C. Stahn, Syria and the Semantics of Intervention,
Aggression and Punishment (2013) 11 JICJ 955, 957–960; C. Stahn, Between Law-
breaking and Law-making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and ‘‘What the Law
Ought to Be’’’ (2014) 19 Journal of Conﬂict and Security Law 25–48.
133 The use of chemical weapons marked a potential threat to international peace
and security, but ‘‘no armed attack’’ under Article 51 UN Charter against any of the
powers contemplating military intervention. There were also no direct eﬀects on
neighbouring countries which might justify the exercise of collective self-defence.
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considered as an instrument to remove the threat of chemical
weapons and to achieve retribution.134
The argument for intervention reversed methodologies. Instead of
justifying calls for the use of international criminal justice, criminal
notions and labels were used to justify recourse to force. This rep-
resents an attack on foundations of the international legal order and
discredits R2P. R2P was not meant be a punitive concept. It is cen-
tered on the idea of protecting civilian populations, rather than
sanctioning moral outrage, horror and fear caused through collective
punishment.135 Its development into a punitive tool, i.e. a ‘‘respon-
sibility to punish’’ State action or inaction, stands partly in contrast
to its humanitarian rationale and would increase fears of instru-
mentalization that have haunted the concept since its inception.136
This approach also weakens international criminal justice. Con-
siderations of guilt and punishment have been associated with the
responsibility of individuals, rather than State responsibility.137 In-
corporating arguments of punishment into intervention has detri-
mental eﬀects. It collectives guilt and uses armed force as a short-cut
to justice.
V END OF A LOVE AFFAIR AND THE ETHICS OF CARE
What implications do these developments have for the interplay be-
tween R2P and international criminal justice? Is it time to end the
love aﬀair?
In family law, a marriage without interaction may be a ground for
divorce. This raises the questions whether a greater separation is
desirable. A closer look at the status quo suggests that there is a need
for both, greater distance to preserve autonomy, and a better con-
134 For a critique, see J. McMahan, Aggression and Punishment’, in L. May (ed.),
War: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
67, at 84 (‘‘Aggressive war is just only when its aims are defensive… just war can be
punitive only when the aim of punishment is defence or deterrence. Just war is never
retributive’’).
135 On the prohibition of collective punishment, see S. Darcy, Prosecuting the
War Crime of Collective Punishment’ (2010) 8 JICJ 29, S. Darcy, Collective Re-
sponsibility and Accountability under International Law (Ardsley, NY: Transnational
Publishers, 2007) 7–185.
136 See Mamdani, (n 5 above) (R2P as ‘‘right to punish’’).
137 See generally B. I. Bonafe´, The Relationship Between State and Individual Re-
sponsibility for International Crimes (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
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nection in certain speciﬁc areas. A number of targeted considerations
may help rethink the existing impasse.
First, too much emphasis may have been put since the outset on
the strategic objective to make R2P operational as a concept within
existing institutional clusters. The focus on implementation has de-
tracted from the foundations of the concept, namely its capacity to
strengthen the responsibility-related aspects of sovereignty. It is key
to understand international criminal justice and R2P not as particular
institutional models,138 but as normative commitments. There is a
need for a more careful return to the foundations. R2P oﬀers an
alternative reading to the social contract’ theory in relation to the
justiﬁcation of public authority.139 It provides a means to inquire
more deeply into the social fabric and limitations of consent, in-
cluding its representation and underlying conditions.140 This nor-
mative foundation needs to be clariﬁed better before further
institutionalization or mainstreaming’. Otherwise R2P will remain a
hollow shell.
Second, there is a need for a certain degree of modesty, in relation
to both R2P and international criminal justice. In existing discourse
(e.g., SG reports, prosecutorial strategy), it is too often assumed that
R2P or justice intervention can solve root causes of conﬂict through
institutional action or impact on rational cost/beneﬁt analysis of in-
dividuals.141 This assumption requires careful scrutiny. It tends to
overestimate the role of international institutions in crisis. Interna-
tional institutions cannot be expected to create justice or security.
They might at best mitigate insecurity and injustice. Lasting condi-
138 Chandler, (n 80 above), at 165. See also the critique by Nouwen, (n 9 above), at
64 (‘‘the concepts correctly assume that states sometimes fail in fulﬁlling their re-
sponsibility to prosecute or to protect, they do not provide for the scenario that the
international community’ is equally, if not more, unwilling or unable’’).
139 See Dworkin, (n 3 above), at 10.
140 See N. Krisch, ’The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global
Public Goods’ (2014) 108 AJIL 1.
141 On alternatives to rationale choice in economic analysis, see World Bank,
World Development Report 2015, Mind, Society and Behaviour (Washington: In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2015). The
report stresses the ‘‘human factor’’ in decision-making, arguing that ‘‘[i]ndividuals
are not calculating automatons. Rather, people are malleable and emotional actors
whose decision making is inﬂuenced by contextual cues, local social networks and
social norms, and shared mental models. All of these play a role in determining what
individuals perceive as desirable, possible, or even ‘‘thinkable’’ for their lives’’. Ibid.,
at 3.
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tions can at best be created by choices that are made domestically or
locally.142 The application of R2P and international criminal justice
strategies requires therefore further acts of translation. Moreover,
what Nouwen qualiﬁed as the ‘‘complementarity paradox’’ also ap-
plies to the relationship between international criminal justice and
R2P more broadly: In circumstances where the State is unable, the
‘‘international community’’ may often be ‘‘even more, unwilling or
unable’’ to remedy ﬂaws.143
Third, it is unhelpful to seek artiﬁcial complementarities between
international criminal justice and R2P. There is need for more careful
distinction between the humanitarian telos of R2P and the goals of
international criminal justice. Rationales of protecting others’ do not
always coincide with the speciﬁc and individual-centered goals of
criminal law. This diﬀerence between traditions has been aptly de-
scribed by Jean Pictet, the main architect of the Geneva Conventions
and its Additional Protocol, in his 1979 Commentary to the Fun-
damental Principles of the Red Cross’:
[W]hile justice rewards each person according to his rights, charity gives to each
according to his suﬀering. To judge means to separate the good from the bad, the
just from the unjust; to measure the degrees of individual responsibility. Charity on
the other hand has nothing whatever to do with this kind of justice … It is more
interested in providing people with what they need than it is with punishing them.144
The goals of international criminal justice should not be inﬂated.145
International criminal justice is not directly meant to serve as conﬂict
resolution mechanisms, nor is it necessarily a suitable instrument to
facilitate the transition to a new political system, as claimed in some
contexts (e.g., Kenya). It might introduce a new international ap-
proach to reduce violence or facilitate security or societal conditions.
Such eﬀects may well be a consequence of action. But they should not
be turned into primary causes of action, since international criminal
142 For such a claim in the transitional justice context, see R. Shaw and L. Waldorf
(eds.), Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
143 See Nouwen, (n 9 above), at 64.
144 J. Pictet, Commentary on the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross (Inter-
national Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1979) 22–23, at
https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/40669/Pictet%20Commentary.pdf.
145 C. Stahn, Between ‘‘Faith’’ and ‘‘Facts’’: By What Standards Should We
Assess International Criminal Justice’ (2012) 26 LJIL 251–282.
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justice lacks the means to realize them. Claiming otherwise might
place ‘‘the cart before the horse’’.
Fourth, the use of the atrocity crime trigger as a motivation or
justiﬁcation of human security action deserves further consideration.
The crime label retains a certain pragmatic appeal because it provides
identiﬁable thresholds. But it also has certain negative side eﬀects that
need to be addressed. Merging the semantics and concepts of criminal
law into the working methods of human rights bodies or the justiﬁ-
cation of the use of force does not necessarily entail progress in re-
lation to human security. It might be more helpful to develop a set of
indicators for violations146 and reliable methods to ascertain then, in
order to provide speciﬁc guidance for humanitarian or human rights
action.
Fifth, it is dangerous to portray international criminal justice in-
stitutions as enforcement tools of R2P. This functionalist logic is
over-simplistic. It oﬀers a wrong conceptualization of the relationship
between international criminal justice and R2P. It blurs the distinc-
tion between international criminal justice and human rights instru-
ments, or might facilitate its use as an instrument of war’ by other
means. International criminal justice requires thus a certain degree of
autonomy. In future practice, it might be more helpful to identify and
develop certain areas, in which the two concepts positively comple-
ment each other. Three of them are discussed brieﬂy here: (i) the alert
function of international criminal justice, (ii) its expressive value and
(iii) compliance.
Monitoring capacity and atrocity alert is a ﬁrst area where the
interplay between R2P and international criminal justice could be
developed. Over past years, preliminary examinations have turned
into one of the most important aspect of ICC proceedings. ICC
scrutiny has become an important factor in shaping dynamics of
conﬂict.147 In the drafting of the Statute, this aspect has only received
minimal attention. One key challenge is to professionalize the con-
ception and methodology of preliminary examinations. ICC pro-
146 For a ﬁrst initiative, see United Nations Oﬃce on Genocide Prevention and the
Responsibility to Protect, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for
Prevention’, July 2014, at http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/frame
work%20of%20analysis%20for%20atrocity%20crimes_en.pdf.
147 See T. Unger and M. Wierda, Pursuing Justice in Ongoing Conﬂict: A Dis-
cussion of Current Practice’, in K. Ambos et al. (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and
Justice: Studies in Transitional Justice, Peace and Development (Heidelberg/Berlin:
Springer, 2009) 263.
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ceedings might provide greater clarity and transparency on the con-
text of violations that may give rise to R2P or serve as a critical
compariter. At the same time, additional precaution needs to be
taken to ensure that the absence of ICC action is not perceived as an
implicit endorsement of conduct or as an indication of lack of gravity
under R2P.
The expressive function of international criminal justice148 is a
second area where mutual engagement may be strengthened. Judg-
ments and legal decisions have an important signal eﬀect, by identi-
fying rules and principles and do’s and don’ts’. The World Summit
Outcome Document formally entrusts the General Assembly with the
task to ‘‘continue consideration of the responsibility to protect’’.149
But in the absence of further regulatory action, jurisprudence may
turn into one of the most important factors clarifying the rough edges
of the R2P doctrine. In certain respects, such as the obligations of
armed groups and state-like and other organizations,150 it is more
progressive151 than R2P which largely ignored the responsibilities of
non-state actors through the speciﬁc focus on responsibilities of the
state. International criminal courts and tribunals, in turn, could rely
more eﬀectively on the normative consensus underlying the obliga-
tion-related side of R2P, in order to highlight positive duties (e.g.,
protection duties, access to humanitarian relief) or arbitrary denial of
state consent.152
148 See e.g., R. D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment:
The Limits of the National Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal
Law’ (2007) 43 Stanford Journal of International Law 40. M. Drumbl, Atrocity,
Punishment and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
173–180.
149 See para. 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document.
150 For discussion, see A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-state
Actors in Conﬂict Situations’ (2006) 88 IRRC 491–523; W. A. Schabas, Punishment
of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed Conﬂict’ (2003) 26 Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal 907–933; G. Werle and B. Burghardt, Do Crimes Against
Humanity Require Participation of a State or a State-like’ Organization?’ (2012) 10
JICJ 1151.
151 See S. Darcy and J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International
Criminal Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
152 On state consent and humanitarian assistance, see C. Ryngaert, Humanitarian
Assistance and the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective’ (2013) 5 Amster-
dam Law Forum 5–19; R. Barber, Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in Inter-
national Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’ (2009) 91 IRRC 386.
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Compliance is a third area where synergies could be used in a more
eﬀective way. R2P could be invoked more systematically to draw
attention to (i) non-cooperation by States in relation to arrest, (ii)
need for follow-up by the Council or (iii) to put pressure on states to
allow access to territory for investigations and prosecutions for core
crimes. Interaction with the Security Council could be strengthened
through adoption of a protocol, or the identiﬁcation of general pa-
rameters, which would guide Council’s actions in cases in which there
are strong indications that the crimes under the Rome Statute are
being committed and no domestic action is taken.153 In the UN
system, the Universal Periodic Review might be used as a venue to
examine issues relating to implementation of speciﬁc statutory pro-
visions, in order to promote eﬀective domestic accountability for
atrocity crimes.154
Sixth, both international criminal justice and R2P require further
reﬁnement in relation to agency. Protagonists of both projects assert
authority on behalf of ’others’. They speak on their behalf and vest
them with certain subjectivities, such as the label of victims’. This has
opened them to criticism.155 In R2P discourse, victims are frequently
treated as homogenous entities (populations, civilians), without dif-
ferentiation among interests or giving them any active voice. In the
aftermath of responses, they are blended out of the picture. Inter-
national criminal justice pays greater attention to the voice of victims
in proceedings. But the argument that agency creates duties of care
remains underdeveloped.156 There is no clear exit strategy for the
aftermath of investigations and prosecutions. Concerns of witnesses
and victims often fall oﬀ the radar screen after testimony. Many
victims are left out of the discourse due to the restricted scope of cases
153 The Council Working Group on Tribunals could serve as a forum for dialogue
on follow-up of referrals, including issues of non-cooperation. See also Trahan, (n
120 above).
154 For a survey of the status quo, see CICC, Seeking Universality of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court Through the United Nations Human
Rights’, 9 May 2014, at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICC_at_the_UPR_19th_
session_(28April-9May2014)_Outcome.pdf.
155 Me´gret, (n 9 above), at 49.
156 See C. Barker, Who cares?: Dag Hammarskjo¨ld and the Limits of Responsi-
bility in International Law’ in Stahn and Melber, (n 129 above) 508–535.
MARITAL STRESS OR GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE?
and collective representation.157 This contradiction needs to be ad-
dressed. The more R2P and international criminal justice assert
power on behalf of others’, the more they need to strengthen the duty
of care.
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157 See S. Kendall and S. Nouwen, Representational Practices at the International
Criminal Court: The Gap Between Juridiﬁed and Abstract Victimhood’ (2014) 76
Law and Contemporary Problems 235–262.
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